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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper discusses the post-‘Lehman Brothers shock’ period of the Japanese foreign direct 
investment in Australia, and provides an analysis of the types of investment.  The analysis begins 
with the theoretical frameworks that define multinational enterprise (MNE) activity, and foreign 
direct investment.  The way in which ‘institutional economics’ theory is utilised within the ‘eclectic 
paradigm’ is also analysed herein.  The ‘Lehman Brothers shock’, the ensuing market decline, and 
the subsequent investor indecisiveness have had effects on foreign direct investment in Asia, the EU, 
and North America (Devos & Giovanoli, 2011).  While this situation continued, one particular 
economic bilateralism, that of Japan and Australia, has remained largely unaffected.  The bilateral 
trade volumes and structure between the two remain unaltered in the aftermath of the ‘shock’.  This 
paper details the Japanese foreign direct investment patterns in Australia that were present before the 
‘Lehman Brothers shock’, and continued afterwards (i.e. several-stage type of acquisitions).  From 
the time of the ‘shock’ until April 2010, there were numerous Japanese acquisitions in Australia 
(Wallace, 2010).  This process has been continuing, as of December 2011, with Japanese MNE 
Inpex’s A$30 billion foreign direct investment in LNG extraction and export project (AAP, 2011; 
AFP, 2011).  Nippon Paper Group’s 2009 foreign direct investment in Australia was the ninth biggest 
Japanese global acquisition in that year (JETRO, 2010: 38), and Mitsubishi Corporation’s September 
2008 foreign direct investment was the tenth largest (JETRO, 2009: 85).  The post-crisis business 
environment has been beset by uncertainties, and the global mergers and acquisitions had recovered 
to merely one third of the 2007 levels by the end of 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011: xii).  This has been the 
global trend, the context of the discussion herein.  As this paper discusses, the global trend, which 
UNCTAD describes, does not readily apply to the Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia.  
 
Keywords: Australia, Lehman Brothers Shock, institutional economics, Japanese foreign direct 
investment 
 
MNE FRAMEWORK AND INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
 
Several frameworks of analysis explain the trade and foreign direct investment activities of MNEs.  
As international trade and international production simultaneously form the MNE domain, they are 
explainable within the same framework of analysis, which is what John H. Dunning’s ‘eclectic 
paradigm’ of ‘OLI (‘ownership’, ‘locational’ and ‘internalisation’) advantages’ does (Ietto-Gillies, 
1992; Tolentino, 2001).  The ‘eclectic paradigm’ offers a comprehensive framework for MNE-
specific, and host nation-specific trade and foreign direct investment activities (Maitland & Nicholas, 
2003; Markusen, 2001).  Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia has been discussed within 
the ‘eclectic’ paradigm framework (Bayari, 2010; 2004; 2001; Nicholas et al., 1996; Purcell et al., 
1999).  The theoretical construction of international business that describe the connection between 
the location of foreign direct investment and the activities of MNEs have been modified in this decade 
to account for the increase in the mobility of firm-specific assets (Dunning, 2009: 6).  The main 
qualification that differentiates an MNE from companies which operate solely in home market (i.e. 
the market of its own nation) remains the fact an MNE operates in foreign markets but relies on its 
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‘home advantages’ (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  The ‘eclectic paradigm’ has evolved over time, 
which enables it to account for changes in the international foreign direct investment environment 
and the investment rationale (Dunning et al., 2007a: 46).  The contemporary structure of foreign direct 
investment has been displaying a ‘regionalisation’ pattern (Dunning, 2005: 160-161).  This is affected 
by the respective gross domestic products and bilateral trade volumes of the two countries that act as 
the host and the investor, respectively (Dunning et al., 2007b: 177-179).  This means an MNE from 
a particular region mainly focuses in that region for its trade and foreign direct investment activities.  
This applies to most MNEs.  Yet, two factors affect an MNE’s decision to be in a particular host 
market that is located in its own region, the size of economy of the host nation, and the size of the 
economy of the nation from which the MNE originates.  Further, existing bilateralism between an 
MNE and a host market also positively affects future activities of the MNE in that particular market.  
An example of this broad framework is the bilateral economic (trade & foreign direct investment) 
relations between Japan and Australia. 
 
Douglas North and Institutional economics: Dunning (2006: 185-187) extends his ‘eclectic’ 
paradigm to include RCMI determinants by incorporating them from ‘institutional economics’ 
inquiry established by Douglas North (see 1990a; 1990b; 1994; 2005).  The study of institutions is 
frequently collected under ‘institutionalism’ (also referred as neo-institutionalism or new 
institutionalism), which holds that institutions, in various ways, dominate all social organisations, and 
their interaction, and that institutions are themselves social products (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Williamson, 2000).  Institutional economics, broadly, focuses on economic activity and economic 
growth under conditions defined by historical institutional developments (see Acemoglu et al., 2001; 
Rodrik et al., 2002; Dunning, 2006; Dunning & Zhang, 2008).  The strand which is based on the 
framework offered by North proposed that differences between nations in terms of economic growth 
and stable wealth growth can, largely, be explained by how each nation sets up and implements its 
own rules to guarantee the success of a defined set of advantageous market behaviour (1990a; 1990b; 
1994; 2005).  Implicit in this argument is the transferable nature of institutions across culturally 
related nations, i.e. from the UK into the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand or from Spain into the 
Americas.  Some nations have developed faster than the rest, and far more homogenously and 
steadily.  Their institutions are the main cause of this, as per the general outlines of this paradigm.  
Australia’s economic success is argued to be related to its transfer of the UK’s institutions, as was 
the case with Canada, the US and New Zealand (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2002).  One 
issue inexplicitly inherent with this framework is related the neo-liberal adoption of neo-classical 
economics’ assumptions.  The global economic activity of the last three decades presents several facts 
versus certain theoretical falsities (see Quiggin 2012).  Economic growth does not translate into an 
equitable distribution of benefits (contrary to ‘the trickle down economics’ framework), the market 
is not the fairest distributive mechanism (contrary to ‘the efficient markets hypothesis’), the post-
1985 global economic history is not one of macroeconomic stability (contrary to ‘the great 
moderation’ thesis), and finally, ‘privatization’ of government functions and services has not been a 
success (Quiggin, 2012: 1-4).  These falsities, as outlined by Quiggin, are essential tenets of Anglo-
Saxon capitalist model.  This model has a leading role in the construction of ‘institutional’ economics, 
which does lead to a potential paradox over the question of economic growth and where the growth 
benefits go.  In the case of Australian economy, the application of neo-liberal deregulation to the 
mining and energy sectors of the economy did ensure their spectacular growth, which highlights the 
verifiability of the North’s institutional economics.  These sectors have developed because of 
legislations, regulations, and governance elements in Australia’s deregulatory period from the 1980s 
onwards.  Mining and energy sectors in Australia have grown due to the existence of neo-liberal 
deregulatory ‘institutions’ that made these sectors highly attractive to massive amounts of foreign 
direct investment.  Yet, the net benefit to Australia, in terms of revenue, from these sectors, has always 
been insufficient (Edwards, 2011), and the sectors’ growth had little positive effect on the wellbeing 
of the majority of Australians (Richardson, 2009: 14).   
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North states that written rules, and monitoring and enforcement systems [formal institutions] interact 
with the operations of long-established informal rules and conformist conduct [informal institutions] 
(1990a: 384; 1990b: 36).  The two types of institutions symmetrically co-exist.  Contemporary 
organisations, such as MNEs, are ‘responses’ to the ‘institutional structures’ (1990a: 396).  Dunning’s 
emphasis on North’s framework especially concerns North’s discussion on institutions that provide 
‘incentive structures and enforcement mechanisms’ and ‘reduction and counteracting of uncertainty’ 
in international trade and foreign direct investment (2006: 184-187).  In broad terms, ‘institutions’ 
refer to the historical and social construction of the existing foundations in modern market economies.  
These are written legal codes, unwritten conventions and rules that define, underwrite, sustain and 
protect people, property rights, contracts, organisations, and provide a range of liberties to MNEs, 
and the states (see Acemoglu et al. 2001; Dunning 2006; Dunning & Zhang 2008; North 2005; 1994; 
Rodrik et al., 2002).   
 
RCMI determinants play a role in defining the competitiveness of national economies and the levels 
of internal and external foreign direct investment, and hence their economic growth (Dunning & 
Zhang, 2008: 3; Rodrik et al., 2002: 3).  Economic activity, such as foreign direct investment, drives 
growth in sectors of a host economy, and is determined by resources, capabilities and markets (RCM), 
which form the ‘physical environment’ (firms and other organisations), and ‘institutions’ (I), which 
provide the incentive structures to make up the ‘human environment’, and set the rules and provide 
motivation for MNEs (Dunning & Zhang 2008: 2).  Incentive structures refer to mechanisms that are 
historic and/or enhanced by legal systems, and which encourage/discourage certain types of 
behaviour and punish others.  These are not ‘neo-classical’ type of ‘single dimensional’ structures 
that define utility and profit seeking behaviour but instead are ‘enforcement mechanisms’ for 
desirable behaviour (2008: 4, 8).  These definitions, of course, follow the definitions by Douglas 
North (1990a; 1990b; 1994; 2005).  Dunning and Zhang are specific about what RCM are (2008: 6).  
‘Resources’ include natural resources, land, labour, and technology.  ‘Capabilities’ include skills, 
expertise, social organisation and governance, while ‘markets’ include not only domestic and foreign 
markets but the ability to exploit and co-ordinate them.  
 
Dunning includes the ‘institutions’ determinant in his ‘eclectic paradigm’ of ‘ownership-locational-
internalisation’ advantages, as a form of ‘institutionally’ related competitive advantage, which 
motivates and influences the extent to which, and the ways in which, RCM are created, deployed or 
accessed (Dunning, 2006: 201-202).  In short, RCMI provide the conditions for foreign direct 
investment and the host interaction, according to Dunning.  It is possible to observe the foreign direct 
investment levels in Australia in a RCMI frame of analysis.  ‘Market efficiency’ and ‘incentive 
structures’ [that are specifically for foreign ownership] are part of the ‘institutions’, which are 
conducive to inward foreign direct investment, according to Dunning.  From the perspective of the 
‘eclectic paradigm’, if the locational advantages of the host include the competitiveness of both 
‘RCM’ and ‘I’ simultaneously, then the optimum conditions of inward foreign direct investment are 
present (Dunning & Zhang, 2008: 10).  In this instance, the location is Australia.  Since the early 
1980s, the relationship between the MNEs and national governments around the globe has become 
increasingly co-operative (Dunning, 1998).  MNE activity has become progressively more dependent 
on institutional underpinnings, reinforcing the relevance of Douglas North’s premise that the 
increasingly complex forms of uncertainty in conjunction with increasing MNE activity point to the 
significance of institutions and institutional responses (Cantwell et al., 2010; Dunning & Lundan, 
2010).  Australian economy experienced a spectacular resources sector (coal, gas, and minerals) 
growth via MNE foreign direct investment from the early 1980s onwards.  Trade and tariff 
deregulation allowed MNEs to benefit from the deregulation to enable free movement of capital, and 
gave them easier access to the Australian market (Stilwell, 2008: 71).  The domestic governance 
determines the social distribution of the benefits of economic growth just as it does determine the 
‘institutional’ attitudes towards foreign direct investment.  Neither element is outside the domain or 
the power of governments.  Cross-cultural and ideological differences influence the decisions over 
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the transfer of ownership advantages overseas (Dunning, 2006: 201, 217).  Nations with common 
economic, social, and political experiences may respond to the transfer of a particular advantage in 
similar ways, especially if they already share a common cultural heritage, as in the Anglo-Saxon 
world (Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the UK, the US).  Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the 
US are termed ‘neo-Europes’ because they all modeled their institutions on the UK, during the 
colonial period of their economic history (Acemoglu et al., 2001: 1376, 1395).  Rodrik et al. (2002) 
too place Australia alongside Canada, New Zealand as ‘neo-European countries’ that developed from 
colonial origins that proceeded with the replication of the UK’s ‘institutions’, and present a model of 
economic growth that is based on the quality of institutions, rather than the affects of geography, 
climate, natural resources, or integration with international trade links.  Thus, Australia is very close 
to the UK and the US in terms of cultural history, and economic governance model (Cahill, 2002; 
Dore, 2002; Harzing & Noorderhaven, 2006).  This is reflected in the fact that the respective labour 
relations environments of the three interact with the Japanese foreign direct investment in the same 
manner (Bayari, 2011; 2010).  In terms of ‘RCMI’ determinants, their institutions have more in 
common with each other than they have with the nations that are outside the Anglo-Saxon world. 
 
THE STATE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE AUSTRALIAN MARKET 
 
Foreign direct investment in Australia consists of ‘portfolio investment’, ‘direct investment’ and 
‘financial derivatives’, and ‘other investment liabilities’, as per the official statistics (ABS 5352.0, 
2011).  These statistics do not identify how much of foreign direct investment is actually reinvested 
earnings, or ‘greenfield’, or for the retooling of going concerns.  The official statistics do not divide 
the figures into industrial sectors, such as the types of manufacturing (food, automotive, plastics etc.).  
One particular ABS trial publication, released in 2001, was entitled Ownership Characteristics of 
Business Undertaking Capital Expenditure in Australia, 1998-1999 (ABS, 2001).  This publication 
highlighted significant differences among the Australian states and territories in terms of the type of 
foreign direct investment (mining, manufacturing etc.).  Foreign direct investment levels in Australia 
stood at approximately A$2 trillion as of 31 December 2010.  Australian investment overseas stood 
at A$1.2 trillion at the same period.  It is possible to comprehend the size of these foreign direct 
investment levels if one considers that Australia’s GDP, at 30 June 2010, was approximately A$1.3 
trillion (ABS 5204.0, 2011:29).  The balance of ‘total assets’ and ‘total liabilities’ (what the 
economists call ‘the net worth of Australia’) was A$7,683 billion at June 30 2010 (ABS 5204.0, 2011: 
10).   
 Table 1: Total Foreign Investment Levels (A$ million) at December 2010 
Origin Total Foreign Investment Foreign Direct Investment Component 
USA 549.88 120.08 
UK 472.64 52.52 
Japan  117.63 49.41 
Hong Kong (SAR) 40.77 6.69 
Germany  40.75 16.22 
Switzerland 40.73 20.73 
TOTAL 1,967.80 473.67 
Source:  Calculated from ABS 5352.0 (2011) 
 
Table 1 shows that the top six investors in Australia are the US, the UK, Japan, Hong Kong (SAR), 
Germany, and Switzerland.  Their levels of total foreign investment (all of their investment, direct or 
otherwise such as portfolio investment), and the foreign direct investment components (percentage 
which ‘direct’ type of investment has within total foreign investment) are as shown.  Foreign direct 
investment represented 24 per cent of the total foreign investment in Australia while ‘portfolio 
investment’ made up 58 per cent, in the period under consideration (ABS 5352.0, 2011).  Foreign 
direct investment component of the respective individual investors vary.  Hong Kong (SAR), the US, 
and the UK have rather small components of foreign direct investment in their total foreign 
investment levels in Australia.  Chart 1 shows the Japanese global foreign direct investment for 1970-
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2009.  There is a downturn in 2009.  There are, by contrast, steady annual increases between 2001 
and 2008.  However, as Chart 2 shows, the Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia has 
actually increased in the same period.  This appears to be reflection of a broader trend.  Australia will 
be the eight major destination of global foreign direct investment in 2011-2013, and Japanese foreign 
direct investment in 2011-2012 will continue to increase (UNCTAD, 2011: 18, 19).  
 
JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
 
From the middle of the 1940s onwards, the IMF, World Bank and GATT emerged as the new 
mechanisms of global system of finance and trade (Bossche, 2005).  The new global finance and trade 
system has underwritten the resumption of trade and foreign direct investment in Asia Pacific, and 
elsewhere.  The present investment and trade relations between Australia and Japan date back to the 
period that began with the 1957 Commerce Agreement.  The 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation, a later bilateral agreement, is the only one of its kind that Australia has concluded with 
any country (Woodard et al., 2007: 16).  Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia has been 
historically at far higher levels than Australian foreign direct investment in Japan (Bayari, 2008; 
2004; 2001, Beeson, 1999; Drysdale, 2010; Edgington, 1990; Sheridan, 1992).  Australian foreign 
direct investment in Japan has been low historically (Australia at Aichi World Expo, 2005: 2, Senate 
Foreign Affairs et al., 2000: 88-110; 188-192).  The post-war bilateral agreements are the 
‘institutional’ context of trade and foreign direct investment relations between Australia and Japan.  
These agreements are the imperceptible background to the ‘locational advantages’ of Australia.  From 
RCMI perspective, Australia possesses resources, market, and institutions that interact with resources 
in the form of foreign direct investment and capabilities in form of transfer of technology and related 
elements.  In the immediate post-war period, the structures that were set in place, via these bilateral 
agreements, between Japan and Australia, have provided a set of trade and foreign direct investment 
conditions.   
 
Chart 1 describes the changes in the total Japanese foreign direct investment per annum.  A negative 
figure (decrease) represents the percentage of decrease from the previous year (base figure).  Chart 2 
shows that the Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia, in dollar terms, has increased in 2004-
2010 continuously.  As shown on Chart 3, Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia has 
increased its share of the total in 2004-2010.  While since 1991, the long-term trend has been one of 
decline; it is remarkable that in the post-’Lehman Brothers shock’ period, the share of the Japanese 
investors has increased, which indicates that the ‘shock’ did not negatively affect the bilateral 
relations.  Japanese overseas production is a wide field.  The past research on Japanese overseas 
production has included the six continents in the last four decades (Abo, 2011; 2007; 2004).  In 
Australia, Bayari (2011; 2010), Beeson (1999), and Edgington (1990) have focused on the nature and 
the extent of Japanese foreign direct investment.  Japanese manufacturing multinationals, which 
currently manufacture in Australia, include Toyota Denso, Aisin, Daikin, Shinagawa, Nissan Casting, 
and YKK.  In the 2008-2011 period, numerous high value Japanese acquisitions of Australian firms 
were completed in a broad range of industries, some if which involve production in Australia.  This 
trend is a continuation of the earlier period.  In the 2000s, foreign direct investment by Marubeni 
Corporation and Tohoku Power Company made an impact with the Milmerran ‘clean coal’ power 
station project, which was the first privately owned power station in Australia (Wilson, 2003).  In 
2001, Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia’s energy and resources market was worth half 
a billion dollars (AJEI, 2003: 2).  In the same year, Australia had new foreign direct investment from 
Fujitsu and NEC in telecommunications and the IT sectors of the Australian market (AJEI, 2003: 2).  
Toyota Australia and [now defunct] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited carried out major new 
foreign direct investment in the early 2000s (Bayari, 2008). 
 
JETRO’s annual White Paper provides some information on the major destinations of Japanese 
foreign direct investment.  In 2002, the main acquisition type of Japanese foreign direct investment 
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in Australia consisted of Paloma Industries’ purchase of a manufacturing unit of Southcorp Ltd for 
US$278 million and Mitsui & Co Ltd’s purchase of Moura coal mine for US$166 million (JETRO, 
2003: 16).  Mitsui is a major player in Australia’s coal exports.  It has interests in BMA Coal, the 
world’s largest coal exporter (Bloomberg, 2003: 23), which displays the extent of its involvement in 
the global coal trade.  In the last decade, the demand from China has set off a resources boom in 
Australia that brings to mind the time of the demand in the post-war growth period.  A new A$11 
billion BHP Billiton iron ore deal had four Chinese steel mills as the majority foreign partners (40 
per cent), with Japan’s CI Minerals Australia and Mitsui Iron Ore keeping a 4.8 per cent and a 4.2 
per cent share respectively (McDonald, 2004: 21).  This highlights Japan’s continual interest in 
strategic foreign direct investments.  In 2004, a Japanese investment fund in an Australian-listed 
property funds for A$120 million was created (Cummins, 2004: 35).  In 2007, there was A$206 
million Japanese foreign direct investment in the Sydney property market, which had been of little 
interest to Japanese investors since the end of Japan’s bubble economy in 1992 (Cummins, 2007: 1).  
In addition, again in 2007, Japanese trading house Sojitz acquired 30 per cent of Grange Resources 
Ltd (AAP, 2007b).  In 2008, Dai-ichi Life Insurance, Japan’s second-largest life-insurer, entered 
Australian finance sector by investing A$376 in Sydney-based Tower Australia Group Limited, the 
life insurance, and superannuation company (John, 2008).  In 2011, Dai-ichi acquired the rest of the 
company for A$1.6 billion (White, 2010: 8).  This made Dai-chi the fourth largest insurance player 
in the Australian market, after National Australia Bank, Commonwealth Bank and ANZ Banking 
Group, which are three of the four biggest Australian banks. 
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Chart 1.  Japanese Global Foreign Direct Investment Change per annum (in %) 
 
Source: Compiled from JETRO (2010, 1995) 
 
Chart 2.  Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Australia (in AUD$) 
 
Source: Calculated from ABS (2011) 
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From the late 1980s onward, a wave of new Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia’s food 
and beverage manufacturing industry started (AJEI, 1989; 1994; Beeson, 1997).  In 2007, there were 
several major Japanese acquisitions in this industry.  Japan’s Kirin Holdings acquired Australia’s 
dairy and fruit juice producer National Foods from San Miguel Corp for A$2.8 billion (AAP, 2007a: 
1; ABC Rural, 2007: 1).  San Miguel Corp of the Philippines is the parent company of San Miguel 
Brewery Inc. of which Kirin Holdings began taking over in 2009 (Fujimura & Ozasa, 2010).  In 2007, 
Kirin Holdings also acquired Tasmanian brewer James Boag and Son, for A$325 million, through 
Lion Nathan (the second largest Australian brewer), which is a firm that is majority-owned by Kirin 
Holdings (Reuters, 2007: 1).  In 2008, Kirin Holdings acquired Australian milk producer Dairy 
Farmers for A$675 million (Bloomberg, 2009a).  In 2009, Kirin Holdings paid A$3.5 billion for the 
remaining 54 per cent of Lion Nathan Ltd (Bloomberg, 2009a), and Asahi Breweries Ltd acquired 
Schweppes Beverages from Cadbury for A$1.2 billion (Cadbury, 2009).   
 
In other sectors of the Australian market too the post-’Lehman Brothers Shock’ acquisitions 
continued.  In the communications sector, Fujitsu purchased Kaz Group Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of the 
national telecommunications carrier Telstra Corporation, for A$200 million, making the Japanese 
company the owner of the third largest IT firm in Australia (Bloomberg, 2009b).  On the 
manufacturing front, Nippon Paper Group Inc. acquired Paper Australia from PaperlinX for A$700 
million (Asia Pulse Comtex, 2009).  On the housing construction front, Sekisui House invested 
A$190 million in a joint venture housing construction in Homebush Bay (NSW) and Ripley Valley 
(QLD) in 2009 (Callick, 2009).  Again, in 2009, Marubeni and Osaka Gas acquired 80.1 per cent of 
APA Group (Australian Pipeline Trust and APT Investment Trust) for A$800 million (APA Group, 
2010).  Further, in Western Australia, the A$3.5 billion Oakajee Deep Water Port and Rail Project 
has substantial investment from Mitsubishi Development Pty Ltd of Mitsubishi Corporation, which 
is Japan’s biggest general trading company (Oakajee Port and Rail, 2011).  Moreover, Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Corporation are planning to build and operate a coal gasification 
power plant in Queensland, to be operational by 2015.  The firm, in partnership with Queensland 
government-affiliated entity ZeroGen Pty Ltd, is investing A$340 million (with further investment 
form Japanese government to follow) in the world’s first such large-scale plant with its carbon-
capture and sequestration techniques (Kachi, 2009; ZeroGen Project, 2009).  Thus far, the biggest 
single Japanese foreign direct investment (A$30 billion) in Australia has been Japanese MNE Inpex’s 
‘Ichthys project’ of LNG extraction (and export) in the Timor Sea off the coast of Western Australia 
(AAP, 2011; AFP, 2011).  As discussed above, the Japanese foreign direct investment in the ‘post-
Lehman Brother shock’ period is quite extensive and spread out across several sectors of the 
Australian economy.  Tables 3 and 4 provide a summary of the present structure of the industry and 
labour market in Australia.  
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Chart 3.  Japanese Foreign Direct Investment as Percentage of All Foreign Direct Investment in Australia (in %) 
Source: Calculated from ABS (2011) 
 
 
Table 2: The Change in the Composition of Australian GDP (%) 
 Industry 1990 2010 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 5.1  2.3 
Mining 4.8  8.4 
Manufacturing 14.5  9.3 
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.5  2.1 
Construction 7.1  7.9 
Wholesale trade 5.9  4.8 
Retail trade 5.8  4.4 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 1.9  2.3 
Transport and storage 5.9  5.2 
Communication services 2.6  3.3 
Finance and insurance 5.5  10.6 
Property and business services 9.9  12.5 
Government administration and defence 4.3  5.2 
Education and training 4.6  4.4 
Health and community services 5.7  6.2 
Cultural and recreational services 1.7  0.8 
Personal and other services 2.0  1.8 
Ownership of dwellings 9.3  8.4 
TOTAL 100 100 
Source: Calculated from ABS 5204.0 (2011) 
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Table 3: Labour Market Share of Australian Industries (%) 
Industry 1990 2010 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 5.5 2.9 
Mining 1.1 1.9 
Manufacturing 14.4 8.5 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 1.3 1.3 
Construction 6.9 9.2 
Wholesale Trade 6.4 3.5 
Retail Trade 14.1 10.8 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 4.6 6.9 
Transport and Storage 4.9 5.1 
Communication Services 1.8 1.9 
Finance and Insurance 4.4 3.8 
Property and Business Services 8.0 12.8 
Government Administration and Defence 4.4 6.3 
Education 6.8 7.8 
Health and Community Services 9.2 11.3 
Cultural and Recreational Services 2.2 1.9 
Personal and Other Services 3.7 4.0 
TOTAL 100 100 
Source: Calculated from ABS 6202.0 (1986-2003) & 6291.0 (2011) 
 
As shown on Tables 2 and 3, Australia’s ‘mining’ sector (location of foreign direct investment from 
Inpex, Sojitz, Mitsubishi Development Pty Ltd, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi 
Corporation) has been increasing its share of GDP and the labour market in the last two decades.  
‘Finance and Insurance Sector’, in which Dai-Ichi invested, has doubled its share of the GDP, as 
shown on Table 2.  The ‘ownership’, ‘locational’ and ‘internalisation advantages’ of Japanese MNEs 
include technology, regional and global distribution networks.  Financial holdings (cash and credit) 
of a MNE are a resource, and an advantage based on ‘ownership’.  UNCTAD singles out Japanese 
MNEs in its latest report for the record levels of cash holdings that they currently possess (UNCTAD, 
2011: 18).  Currency holdings as a ‘resource’ are also a part of ‘RCMI’ paradigm.  ‘Locational 
advantages’ in Australia, are implicit in the fact that the firms in food, and resources production are 
open to foreign acquisition, and that there is a supply of agricultural and dairy produce, minerals, gas 
and coal as resources in respective industries that are hosting foreign direct investment.  
 
OTHER MNE PERSPECTIVES 
 
The ‘firm specific advantages’ and ‘country specific advantages’ framework of MNE behaviour 
authored by Alan Rugman is somewhat relevant to this aspect of Japanese foreign direct investment 
in Australia.  MNEs expand abroad via an interaction of their ‘firm specific advantages’ and ‘country 
specific advantages’ of the host (Rugman and Li, 2007: 341).  MNEs do business primarily in their 
own regions (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Hirst et al., 2009).  Rugman also shows that the world’s 
trade and foreign direct investment take place predominately within the triad of the EU, North 
America, and Asia Pacific.  The bulk of the business interests (73.2 per cent) of Asia Pacific MNEs 
(i.e. Japan, South Korea, China, Australia) are in the same region (Rugman and Li, 2007: 333; 338).  
In seeking to outline a theory of Asian MNEs, Collinson and Rugman emphasise that most Japanese 
MNEs, and other Asian MNEs see Asia as their primary domain, except a few large Japanese MNEs 
that de-coupled from ‘home region’ or adapted and customized to compete in other regions (2007: 
441).  Overall, Asia is the primary region of Japanese MNEs (Collinson and Rugman, 2008: 227).  
The two authors also count Australia as part of Asia, just as they count Australian MNEs as Asian.  
In Asia, merger and acquisition-type of foreign direct investments have been more popular in the last 
two decades (Athreye and Kapur, 2009: 211).  A MNE seeks economies of scale and scope by 
integrating its interests across its home region countries by applying ‘firm specific advantages’, 
according to Rugman and Oh in their study of the international competitiveness of Asian MNEs 
(2008: 69).  This is the case with Japanese MNEs, many of which have a strong intra-regional 
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dimension to their foreign direct investment activities (Collinson and Rugman, 2008).  Japan and 
Australia have had a continuous bilateral trade and foreign direct investment relationship since the 
1950s, which is governed by the GDP structures of the both, in terms of resource exports from 
Australia and the industrial exports from Japan (Bayari, 2008).  Rugman and Verbeke provide a strong 
case that Asian MNEs, including the Japanese MNEs, follow a regional strategy in Asia (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2004; 2005; 2007; 2008).  Dunning et al. (2007) and Dunning (2009) emphasise that the 
size and the nature of GDP of countries involved in bilateralism and the nature of their trade as being 
more relevant than MNE strategy of regionalisation.  A long-term study can shed more light on this 
two differing premises.  This paper has provided a case that is relevant to the framework in Dunning 
et al. (2007a; 2007b), especially with the emphasis that Dunning (2006) places on North’s 
institutional economics analysis.  That is, Australia’s institutions, especially since the 1980s 
deregulation, that govern MNE and foreign direct investment activity, have allowed the maintenance 
of the specific bilateralism with Japan.  In other words, in studies of bilateral relationships, 
institutional responses are highly relevant, while the regional patterns of MNE activity (i.e. how 
MNEs behave in their own regions, as in how Japanese MNEs invest and trade in Asia-Pacific) is 
arguably pertinent. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The paper has discussed the new Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia in the aftermath of 
the ‘Lehman Brothers shock’, when the global foreign direct investment activity suffered a decline.  
It has covered the role of institutional economics in analysis of international trade and foreign direct 
investment.  The Australian market has remained relevant for new foreign direct investment, and 
Japanese MNEs have continued their international investment activities.  In 2011-2012, Japan’s 
global foreign direct investment has been projected to be unaffected by the slowdown in its domestic 
market.  The paper has discussed the theoretical frameworks of the ‘eclectic paradigm’, and the 
‘RCMI’ paradigm derived from North’s ‘institutional economics’.  These are two related analytical 
methods, which focus on foreign direct investment, and international trade (Dunning, 2006; Dunning 
& Zhang, 2008; Cantwell et al., 2010, Dunning & Lundan, 2010).  The ‘institutional economics’ 
paradigm’s elements are vigorous.  They are not discernible in every instance, as in, for example, 
long lasting bilateral relations grounded on settlement type of agreements, that influence subsequent 
foreign direct investment behaviour, and the host response.  The paper has provided current statistics 
on Australia and Japan bilateralism, and the Japanese global foreign direct investment.  As stated, 
these elements mostly do not conform the global foreign direct investment trends.  The UNCTAD 
figures project that Australia is one of the few markets that will remain a major foreign direct 
investment destination in 2011-2013.  Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia has continued 
after the ‘Lehman Brothers shock’ in September 2008, and this has occurred in an environment in 
which, by the end of 2010, global foreign direct investment was only one-third of its 2007 peak.  
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